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by  Kofi Obeng 
This	paper	determines	the	deadweight	loss	of	operating	and	capital	subsidies	by	extending	Tullock’s	
(1998)	work.	It	finds	that	when	both	subsidies	are	received	deadweight	loss	is	6.83%	of	total	cost	
or	$0.861	million	on	the	average,	$0.780	million	when	operating	subsidy	is	received	and	$0.0503	
million	when	capital	subsidy	is	received.	Decomposing	the	deadweight	loss	using	regression	shows	
that	the	incentive	tier	of	the	federal	operating	subsidy,	federal	labor	protection,	fleet	size,	and	the	
number	of	maintenance	facilities	owned	are	positively	associated	with	it	while	leasing	maintenance	
facilities	and	absence	of	dedicated	funding	sources	are	negatively	associated	with	it.
INTRODUCTION
Subsidies can lead to resource misallocation by shortening asset life (Taubman and Rasche 1971), 
and making transit systems buy more vehicles than they actually need. If they extend asset life, as 
these authors also note, a misallocation of resources could occur because unproductive capital must 
be kept for a long time and assets too costly to maintain would continue to be used. In U.S. public 
transit systems, such a misallocation takes the form of the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) 
requiring that vehicles purchased with federal capital subsidies must be used for at least 12 years. In 
addition, there have been reports of inadequate internal controls leading to waste of transit subsidies. 
In 1992, New Jersey Transit dismissed its auditor responsible for bus subsidy programs because 
he failed to detect misuse of the pass-through operating subsidies it gave to Middlesex Metro Inc. 
of New Brunswick and Monmouth Bus Lines of Asbury Park. It was found that approximately $1 
million of the subsidies these two companies received were spent on gambling trips, alimony and 
home furnishings (New York Times 1992).
Another type of inefficiency reported is the effect of subsidies on wages. Winston (2000) notes 
the works of Pickrell (1985) and Lee (1987) that show that as much as 75% of transit subsidies go to 
increase labor wages and increase the profits of transit equipment suppliers. To illustrate his point, 
Winston (2000) wrote at that time that a typical Washington, D.C., Metrobus driver was paid twice as 
much as a typical driver of one of the private bus companies in  that area.  Also, the subsidies create 
a “quiet life” by making transit systems expand their services and pursue other objectives besides 
cost minimization. Others are, they could make managers show expense preference for some inputs 
such as staff or visible inputs; they release unobligated non-federal funds for rent-seeking activities1 
and they could reduce motivations to be efficient and create X-inefficiency (Leibenstein 1966). Or, 
in the context of Tullock’s (1967) utility maximizing manager, they could increase cost rapidly to 
justify even larger subsidies if the manager’s rewards are a percentage of cost. The feeling that the 
subsidies provide “easy money” also may lead to persistent “managerial incompetence ….without 
willful shirking of work force” (Berger and Hannan 1988: 455).
In the past, several researchers have calculated inefficiency costs especially from monopoly 
price distortions and market power. Harberger (1954) initiated this calculation by showing that 
the inefficiency cost of monopoly price distortion is the sum of the lost producer and consumer 
surpluses denoted in Figure 1 by the triangle bounded by the vertical line through the monopolist’s 
output (Q
M
), demand (dd) and marginal cost (MC), which later became Harberger’s triangle. Using 
this triangle, he calculated the inefficiency cost of imperfect competition in the U.S. to be 0.1% 
of GNP. van Dijks and van Bergeijk (1997) estimated a weighted average welfare cost of 15% for 
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the Dutch economy, and Solis and Maudos (2008) estimated the social cost of market power in the 
Mexican banking system as 0.15% of GDP.
Tullock (1967) added to this calculation when he introduced his loss triangle (Figure 2). Using a 
constant cost assumption, he showed that with a unit cost of h	a budget maximizing manager would 
produce (Q
s
) instead of (Q
c
) yielding a deadweight loss equivalent to the triangle bounded on the left 
by demand (dd), on the right by the vertical line going through output produced (Q
s
), and on top by a 
horizontal marginal cost line (h). This deadweight loss is triangle abc in Figure 2. In his model costs 
increase because the manager must employ more resources to produce the extra output Q
s	
− Q
c
 to 
increase his compensation. According to Tullock (1967) “The true bureaucratic (budget) maximizer 
would exercise close control over costs in order to waste his resources where they would do him the 
most good” (p. 94). As long as this loss is less than the consumer surplus, Tullock argues that the 
manager would expand output. Tullock (1998) extended his analysis to show that when subsidies 
are provided a similar loss triangle as abc in Figure 2 can be derived whose area is the deadweight 
cost of the subsidies.
In this paper, we extend Tullock’s triangle to calculate the deadweight loss of operating and 
capital subsidies offered to U.S. public transit systems. The approach followed, however, is different, 
in that we focus on input distortions when input subsidies are offered, calculate the deadweight loss 
for each input, and add them to obtain the deadweight loss of the subsidies. We estimate that the 
deadweight loss of operating and capital subsidies is 6.83% of the total cost of a typical single mode 
bus transit system or $0.861 million on the average. The deadweight loss from the subsidies going 
to labor is $0.440 million compared to $0.085 million and $0.336 million from the subsidies going 
to capital and the other inputs respectively. The decomposition of the deadweight loss among its 
sources using regression shows that federal labor protection, the number of maintenance facilities 
owned, fleet size and the federal formula for allocating the incentive tier of Section 5307 operating 
funds to transit systems are positively associated with the loss. The deadweight loss is smaller in 
transit systems that do not have dedicated local funding or own their maintenance facilities. 
BACKGROUND
In the U.S., operating and capital subsidies are input specific and are offered to AMTRAK (the national 
intercity rail company), merchant marine companies in the forms of construction differential2 and 
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Figure 2: Tullock’s Triangle
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operating differential subsidies and transit systems.3 In transit systems operating subsidies cover the 
costs of labor, fuel and materials, while capital subsidies are for buying and rehabilitating equipment, 
right-of-way protection and acquisition, and corridor development to support new fixed guideways. 
Lately, federal legislation has changed how capital subsidies are used and who can receive federal 
operating subsidies. Both the Transportation Equity Act for the Twenty-First Century (TEA-21) 
and the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005 discontinued federal operating subsidies to transit 
systems operating in cities with more than 200,000 populations and broadened the definition of 
what can be done with federal capital subsidies to include maintenance and other activities. Because 
federal capital subsidies pay 80% of cost and operating subsidies pay 50% of operating losses on 
the margin, large transit systems welcomed this change because it requires less local matching funds 
when used for non-capital purposes, such as short run costs. Besides the federal government, state 
and local governments also offer capital and operating subsidies. 
Table 1 shows real capital and operating subsidies received by U.S. public transit systems from 
1995 to 2006. In column 2 operating subsidies from dedicated sources increased from $1.013 billion 
in 1995 to $1.387 billion in 2008 or by 36.89% (3.35% per year) while column 3 shows that local 
subsidies increased from $2.612 to $3.524 billion or by 34.92% (3.17% per year). Adding these two 
columns together and comparing the results in column 4 to the state and federal operating subsidies 
in columns 5 and 6 respectively, real local operating subsidies are very large and almost equal the 
sum of the same subsidies from the state and federal governments. For example, real local subsidies 
were $4.912 billion in 2006 compared to $1.286 and $3.807 billion in federal and state operating 
subsidies respectively. Column 7 shows that real operating subsidies from all sources increased 
steadily from $6.674 billion in 1995 to $10.004 billion in 2006, an increase of 49.89% or 4.54% 
per year. At the same time, in column 8, real capital subsidies increased by 39.46% from $4.745 to 
$6.617 billion or at a rate of 3.59% per year.
Comparatively, Table 2 shows real operating revenues and operating costs. As can be seen, real 
transit operating revenues grew by 39.72% or 3.61% per year while real operating expenditures 
grew by 35.69% (or 3.24% per year). Subtracting the real passenger revenues in column 2 from the 
real operating costs in column 5, column 6 shows operating losses before subsidies are considered. 
From this column, passenger revenue is not enough to cover operating costs. However, subtracting 
the total operating cost in column 5 from the operating funds (inclusive of operating subsidies but 
excluding capital subsidies) in column 4, column 7 shows that transit systems in total made real 
after-subsidy operating profits, a result consistent with what Obeng (2000) reported. These after-
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Table 1: Operating and Capital Funds ($ millions)
Operating Subsidies ($ millions) Capital Subsidies 
($ millions) 
Year 
Real 
Local 
Funds
Real 
Dedicated
Funds
Total 
Local 
Funds
Real 
State 
Funds
Real 
Federal  
Funds
Real 
Operating 
Subsidies
Real Capital 
Subsidy
1995 1013.25 2612.14 3625.39 2512.86 536.09 6674.34 4744.95
1996 1080.56 2631.29 3711.85 2601.53 380.11 6693.50 4514.90
1997 1161.12 2551.46 3712.58 2441.56 403.12 6557.26 4890.66
1998 1198.40 2685.21 3883.61 2625.40 460.86 6969.88 4842.21
1999 1371.25 2724.97 4096.22 2928.33 523.29 7547.84 5386.98
2000 1137.57 3088.73 4226.30 2884.49 577.35 7688.15 5567.36
2001 1098.08 3329.53 4427.61 3219.03 638.00 8284.64 6447.60
2002 1229.18 2970.48 4199.66 3734.63 733.41 8667.70 7141.47
2003 1382.99 3020.43 4403.42 3604.78 878.37 8886.58 7195.98
2004 1369.77 3273.85 4643.62 3553.84 1104.24 9301.69 7012.18
2005 1328.01 3409.01 4737.02 3837.43 1179.42 9753.87 6340.71
2006 1387.20 3524.40 4911.60 3806.65 1285.66 10003.92 6617.26
Real profit is in 1982-84 constant dollars. Data for operating expenditure and total operating funds obtained 
from American Public Transit Association (2008). 2008 Public Transportation Fact Book, 59th Edition. APTA, 
Washington, D.C.
Table 2: Passenger Fare Revenue and Fares per Unlinked Trip
These are in 1982-84 constant millions of dollars. Except real after-subsidy profit the data are from: American 
Public Transit Association (2008). 2008 Public Transportation Fact Book, 59th Edition. APTA, Washington, 
D.C.
Year
 
Real 
Passenger 
Revenues
($ million)
Real Fare 
per 
Unlinked 
Passenger 
Trip ($)
 
Real Total 
Operating 
Funds
(TOF)
($)
 
Real Total 
Operating 
Cost
(TOC)
($)
Operating 
Losses 
before 
Subsidies
($)
subsidy 
profit 
RP=TOF-
TOC 
($)
Real after-
1995 4462.533 0.58 11968.90 11711.75 7249.217 257.15
1996 4726.769 0.59 12205.99 11689.42 6962.660 516.57
1997 4701.371 0.56 12158.82 11798.19 7096.819 360.62
1998 4889.325 0.56 12921.35 12109.51 7220.185 811.84
1999 4971.429 0.54 13337.45 12312.18 7340.751 1025.27
2000 5078.862 0.54 14078.16 13150.70 8071.838 927.47
2001 5020.384 0.52 14278.94 13278.71 8258.326 1000.23
2002 4807.615 0.50 14804.00 13804.34 8996.725 999.67
2003 4972.446 0.53 15228.91 14484.57 9512.124 744.35
2004 5174.484 0.54 15732.19 15090.42 9915.936 641.77
2005 5258.116 0.54 16235.43 15511.98 10253.864 723.45
2006 5553.026 0.56 16723.12 15891.47 10338.444 831.65
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subsidy profits increased almost four-fold (398.65%) from $257.12 million in 1995 to $1.025 billion 
in 1999, fell in 1998 to $927.47 million before rising again to $1 billion in 2001. Between 2001 and 
2006, real after-subsidy profits declined by 16.85% to $831.65 million. These aggregate national 
trends may, however, not hold for some individual transit systems where deficits persist even after 
subsidies are received. For such transit systems their sources of subsidies may not generate enough 
revenues for them to realize after-subsidy profits. The same data source (American Public Transit 
Association 2008) shows that between 1995 and 2006 total unlinked passenger trips increased by 
29.04%, while in Table 2 real passenger revenue increased less slowly by 24.44% (2.22% per year) 
and real fares per unlinked passenger trip declined by 3.45% (-0.31% per year). 
Therefore, the reasons for the real after-subsidy profit are increased transit ridership, and the 
strong growth in real operating subsidy of 4.54% per year outpacing the growth in real operating 
cost of 3.24% per year. From a public policy perspective, the amount of subsidy provides indications 
of the value the government places on public transit services; a higher amount showing a very 
high value and a lower amount indicating otherwise. Thus, if public transit subsidy is increasing, 
as we have found, it suggests that the government sees the service as essential in accomplishing 
some social objectives. Furthermore, the sizes of the subsidies reflect the varying objectives which 
transit systems are called upon to achieve such as making public transit services easily available 
as a competitive mode of urban transport, improving air quality, mobility and accessibility, and 
saving energy. As well, they reflect economic activity especially as regards those subsidies that are 
tied to sales, property and gasoline taxes; these subsidies rise with economy growth and fall during 
economic downturns. 
THEORETICAL MODEL
Given the discussion above it is assumed that transit systems pursue after-subsidy cost minimization 
in producing outputs which satisfy their mandates. For, with real fares declining, this objective 
ensures that they can earn after subsidy profits. Of course, the dual of this objective could also lead 
to after-subsidy profits since it implies cost minimization (Nash1978). Additionally, maximizing 
operating subsidies from all sources and maximizing fare revenues could increase after-subsidy 
profits, but the former could create so much wasteful expenditures such as on lobbying for subsidies 
that we do not consider it viable. Therefore, assume a rational transit system whose input-output 
decision is to minimize after-subsidy total cost given its demand and operating environment. This 
decision is constrained by U.S. federal and state government regulations and policies about subsidies 
and service. Likewise, local governments and transit boards may restrict transit systems’ budgets 
and outputs (as happens in those contracted services where the amount of output to be provided 
is fixed) or they may set service goals. The transit manager accepts these restrictions and makes 
decisions about input use to minimize total cost. Thus, for the manager, output is exogenous and 
his task is to minimize the cost of producing it. Further, because U.S. federal and state governments 
have formulae for operating and capital subsidies based on output, cost and other variables, the 
rational manager can affect the amount of subsidies he receives by changing the variables in the 
formula under his control. For such a manager, these variables are those which affect output and 
cost. Hence, he considers operating and capital subsidies endogenous and it is assumed that he 
chooses inputs to minimize total cost net these subsidies. Implicitly, this involves maximizing 
revenues from subsidies.
For example, in buying buses, the amount of capital subsidies a transit system receives from 
federal sources depends upon the number bought. At the margin this subsidy is 0.8(rK) where, r 
is the price of a vehicle, K the vehicles bought and 0.8 the federal share in capital cost. Similarly, 
because the federal share in operating losses is 50% at the margin, the total federal operating 
subsidies a transit system receives is 0.5(FR	–	wL	–	pF) where, FR is fare revenue, w and p are the 
respective prices of labor (L) and other inputs (F). In both cases the amounts of the subsidies clearly 
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depend upon input levels and the manager would want to maximize these subsidies4 within the 
limits imposed by the federal government. 
Further support for endogeneity is from the federal formula for allocating operating 
subsidies, which is now being used to allocate capital subsidies to transit systems under the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. This formula shows that the amount of subsidies 
received directly depends upon vehicle miles (Q), population (POP) and population multiplied 
by population density (D) and passenger miles (PM) squared over operating cost (C
o
), i.e.,(PM)2 
/ C
o
. Considering that passenger miles depend upon vehicle miles of service provided, that is 
PM = g(Q[L,K,F]), and that operating cost is C
o
 = wL + pF the federal operating subsidy
each transit firm receives can be written in functional form as 
, or alternatively as A
o	
= A
o
 (POP,
D,L,K,F).  Thus, the amount of subsidy a transit system receives under the current federal formula 
depends on the amount and types of input used. Therefore, an after-subsidy cost minimizing transit 
system would use more of the inputs for which the federal government provides more subsidy and 
less of the other inputs given their marginal costs and marginal products. For U.S. public transit 
systems this could imply overuse of capital relative to other inputs such as labor and fuel. It could 
also imply higher levels of use of all inputs under economies of scale because output increases more 
than does cost and this, in turn, increases the federal operating subsidy a transit system receives 
based upon output and the incentive tier.
With subsidy as endogenous consider a transit system that receives operating and capital 
subsidies from sources including federal, state and local governments and that minimizes its after-
subsidy cost  subject to a production function constraint,
Q = Q(L,F,K). Here, output (Q) is in terms of vehicle miles,5 A
o
 and A
K
  are operating and capital 
subsidies respectively and the prices of labor (L), capital (K) and all other inputs (F) are w,	r,	p	in 
that order as noted earlier. For a transit system that minimizes its after-subsidy cost the Lagrangian 
of its optimization problem is,
(1) 
 
From the first order conditions of this minimization and for an input pair such as labor and capital, 
the ratio of their respective marginal products f
L
 and f
K
  is,
(2)
Where LwAHLwAH LKKLLooL /,/ ==  and 
KwAHKwAH KKKKKooK /,/ ==  are the 
shares of the subsidies in input costs, and to fully account for deadweight loss we assume full 
allocation of each subsidy among all inputs so there is no unspent subsidy. This implies that 
Σ
i	
µ
oi
 = Σ
i	
µ
Ki
 = 1 where	i = K,	L,	F.  The parameters µ
oi
 and µ
Ki		
are the respective elasticities of 
operating and capital subsidy with respect to an input. For each input, the term in parentheses after its 
price in Eq. (2) is the proportion that a transit system pays from passenger revenue. Additionally,   w* 
and r* are the respective misperceived unit prices of labor and capital.6  Because these misperceived 
input prices are lower than actual input prices they alter the optimal rates of input substitution and 
create allocative distortions. That is, if we assume that given input market prices and each transit 
system hires the efficient combination of inputs, then the optimal rate of input substitution should 
be w	/	r in Eq. (2) and ξ
LK
	 is the amount by which subsidies make transit systems deviate from 
this optimal input rate of substitution. For example, if we consider federal operating and capital 
subsidies and assume they target only labor and capital respectively then µ
KK	
H
KK
  and µ
oL
H
oL
 are 
respectively 0.8 and 0.5 since in this case µ
oL
  and µ
KK
 take values of one and the other terms in Eq. 
( ) ( )],,[),,(,,,,
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(2) disappear. Consequently, f
L
 / f
K
 = (1− 0.5)w/(1− 0.8)r = 2.5 w/r   and suggests 2.5 times overuse 
of capital relative to labor. Comparatively, and by the same assumption, using the percentages of the 
local match for capital and operating subsidies in this equation for µ
KK	
H
KK
 and µ
oL
H
oL	
respectively 
gives the ratio of the marginal products as  f
L  
/ f
K
 = 0.5w	/	0.8r	=	0.625	w	/	r  showing overuse of 
labor relative to capital. Thus, both local and federal subsidies distort the optimal rates of input 
substitution differently or create allocative distortion. This allocative distortion is ξ
LK	
in Eq. (2) and 
a part of its cost is deadweight loss, which can be calculated by combining the information in Eq. 
(2) with Tullock’s (1997) work whose description follows.
Tullock (1998) considered a service that received government subsidies and showed as in Figure 
2 that a part of the subsidies would be wasted in providing this service. Following his approach and 
consistent with the discussion earlier the demand for the service is dd, the average cost is h	and 
it is the same as marginal cost, the subsidized average cost is c
s
 and the quantity demanded is Q
s
. 
The government’s cost of the subsidy is the rectangle hbcc
s	
, and the trapezoid hacc
s 
is the benefit 
consumers enjoy by using the subsidized service, while according to Tullock (1998), triangle abc is 
the deadweight cost (loss) if the subsidies are not a result of rent seeking activities.
Figure 3: Labor Demand
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w*
d
d 
a 
b
c
$ 
e 
L* 
Labor 
LO
Analogous to Tullock’s exposition, Figure 3 from Obeng and Sakano (2000, 2008) shows input 
demand when a transit system receives operating and capital subsidies. The transit system’s demand 
for an input such as labor is dd,7 its market wage rate is w	and, before the subsidies, it employed 
L*  units of labor and enjoyed a consumer surplus of dwa. Because it receives operating and capital 
subsidies, L*  is not the quantity of labor it demands. From Eq. (2), that quantity is based upon the 
misperceived wage or implied price w
* at which the transit system employs L units of labor, enjoys a 
consumer surplus of dcw* and incurs a total resource cost of wL and an implied resource cost of w
*L. 
These costs are respectively waL*O and w*cL*O, and total subsidy is wbcw*. The subsidies result 
in an increase in benefits to the firm of wacw* from which after subtracting the total amount of the 
subsidy wbcw* going to labor, gives a deadweight loss triangle abc which is similar to Tullock’s. 
This triangle is the portion of the subsidy going to labor wasted or misspent perhaps because of 
over-employment, lax management or inability to negotiate well with labor and it is also equal to 
the area aec in Figure 3. For each input, Eq. (A.5) in Appendix A shows that the deadweight loss 
(DWL
L
) can be calculated as, 
(3) 
( )
( ) KFLiforHH
HHCSDWL
KiKioioii
KiKioioii
i ,,
2 1
2
=
++
+
=
µµη
µµ
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Where, n
i
  is input demand elasticity, C is the observed total cost, S
i
  the observed share of an input 
in total cost, and all other terms are defined already. 
Obviously in Eq. (3), the size of the deadweight loss depends upon the own price elasticity 
of input demand. If input demand is price elastic this loss would be large, the reverse being true 
if it is price inelastic. For example, if input demand is perfectly price elastic, the first term in the 
denominator is zero and deadweight loss is 0.5CS
i
(µ
oi
H
oi
 + µ
Ki
H
Ki
). On the other hand, if it is 
perfectly price inelastic, the first term in the denominator becomes very large and the deadweight 
loss approaches zero. Similarly, the size of the loss depends upon the amount of operating or capital 
subsidy received. As operating subsidy becomes very large the deadweight loss becomes 0.5CS
i
µ
oi
H
oi	
 
and as it approaches zero the deadweight loss disappears. Taking the sum of this equation over all 
inputs and dividing both sides of the result by actual total cost gives the share of the deadweight 
loss in cost.
Either Eq. (3) or this share of deadweight loss in cost can be used to compare transit systems in 
terms of inefficiency. However, when this equation is used a quasi optimal amount of each subsidy 
can be determined under some restrictive assumptions. By observation, most of the deadweight loss 
occurs in the targeted input which has the largest share in cost. Operating subsidy covers short run 
cost and labor’s share in it is approximately 66.1% (American Public Transit Association 2008). 
Capital subsidy too is largely for vehicle, facility and right-of way acquisition. Therefore, most 
of the deadweight losses in operating and capital subsidies would be in labor and capital demand 
respectively. Hence, assume DWL	is fixed for all inputs except the most important input in terms 
of cost share targeted by the subsidy. Then, write similar equations as Eq. (3) for labor and capital 
and differentiate that for labor with respect to A
o
 and that for capital with respect to A
K
  as done in 
Appendix A. Setting the results of the differentiation to zero and solving gives the quasi optimal 
levels of the subsidies. For operating subsidy, this yields,
(4)
Where, Â
o
  is the quasi optimal operating subsidy. 
Eq. (4) suggests large operating subsidy if the targeted input has price inelastic demand and 
small operating subsidy if it has price elastic demand. It also suggests large operating subsidies if 
the elasticity of subsidy with respect to the targeted input is very small. No operating subsidy should 
be given if the targeted input has perfectly elastic demand according to this equation. By a similar 
approach the quasi optimal capital subsidy can be obtained. As shown in Appendix A these optimal 
subsidies are the maximum that should be offered. Their values vary by transit system because input 
cost and own-price elasticity of input demand also vary by transit system. Dividing the operating 
or capital subsidy received by its corresponding optimal amount shows which transit system has 
excess subsidies.
EMPIRICAL MODELS
The determination of excess subsidy and the calculation of deadweight loss both require specifying 
and estimating an equation to obtain the values of the coefficients in Eq. (3). In this study these 
coefficients are from a cost function that does not assume cost minimization and that extends the 
information in Eq. (2). Recall from this equation that the implied prices of labor, capital and all other 
inputs are respectively w*, r*, p* and are what transit systems misperceive as their input prices. 
Using these prices, total implied cost is C*	=	w*L	+	r*K	+	p*F as compared to actual total cost 
C = wl + rK + pF	and its functional form is C*w*, r*, p*,Q. From Shephard’s lemma, Appendix B 
shows that actual total cost is related to total implied cost because the partial derivative of implied 
cost with respect to implied input price is input demand and it is the same as the partial derivative of 
actual total cost with respect to actual input price. Eq. (B.2) in Appendix B shows that the logarithm 
of actual total cost is, 
oLL
o
o
LwA
µη
=ˆ
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(5) lnC = lnC*	+	lnυ
Where υ is the factor by which total implied cost must be multiplied to obtain actual total cost. 
Alternatively, υ − 1 is the proportion by which actual total cost exceeds total implied cost.8 Thus, 
(υ − 1)C* is the amount of the subsidy or wbcw* in Figure 3 and it is far larger than the deadweight 
loss, abc.
Clearly, Eq. (5) is deterministic and assumes that the exact values of C*	and υ are known and 
free of errors. However, they are not because some of their terms are estimated. Therefore, we add 
a random error term ε
1
 to it to obtain lnC = lnC* + lnυ + ε
1
. Expanding the minimum implied cost 
function C*w*, r*, p*,Q by Taylor’s series up to the second order and substituting the result into 
lnC = lnC* + lnυ + ε
1 
gives Eq. (B.3) in Appendix B to be estimated jointly with the actual cost share 
equations derived in the same appendix as Eq. (B.6). This estimation is done after imposing linear 
homogeneity constraints on the coefficients of input prices, and the requirement for full allocation of 
all subsidies among the inputs, i.e., ∑
i	
μ
oi
 = ∑
i	
μ
Ki
 = 1 where		i =  K, L, F.  Furthermore, for estimation, 
all the variables are mean centered, except the shares of inputs in actual total cost and the ratios of 
the subsidies to actual input costs, the latter of which are allowed to take their actual values to ensure 
the mean firm has allocative distortion from the subsidies.
Decomposition Variables
Estimating the cost and share equations as described, however, does not identify the sources of 
deadweight loss, but provides the coefficients μ
oi 
 and μ
Ki
 needed to calculate this loss. Those 
sources can be identified through a second stage regression by estimating the hypothesized linear 
decomposition equation below: 
(6)
Where, the dependent variable is the sum of the deadweight losses from the subsidies going to 
labor, capital and the other inputs.9 In Eq. (6) also, ω and ε   2 are the set of parameters to be estimated 
and the error term respectively, and X
m
 the set of variables described below. More specifically, ω 
gives the marginal dollar values of the variables in the decomposition equation. If it is negative 
(positive), an increase in the variable with that coefficient is associated with a decrease (increase) in 
deadweight loss. The variables with negative coefficients, therefore, provide some bases for policies 
to reduce deadweight losses.
Federal Labor Protection. A source of waste from subsidies comes from the provisions of the 
Federal Transit Act. Section 5333 (b) of Title 49 of the United States Code (formerly Section 13(c) 
of the Federal Transit Act), states that Federal funds received by transit systems as subsidies cannot 
be used to worsen labor conditions. Transit systems receiving these subsidies must have in place 
plans to protect employees who may be affected by capital acquisition or service improvements 
from layoffs. It requires paid training and retraining of employees whose jobs are affected by 
Federal assistance. For those who lose their jobs, Section 5333(b) requires transit systems to pay 
them a dismissal allowance not to exceed six years of their salaries and benefits. Where the job of an 
employee of a transit system receiving the subsidies is downgraded she must be paid a displacement 
allowance equal to the difference in wages in her current and previous positions. This labor protection 
clause limits transit systems in terms of their abilities to substitute other inputs for labor and leads to 
inefficiencies in the form of overuse of labor relative to capital or fuel. For example, a transit system 
that replaces its fleet of small buses with large ones bought with federal subsidies must protect the 
interests of its affected drivers by making equitable arrangements for them through negotiations 
with the unions representing them and having such arrangements certified by the Secretary of Labor. 
20 εωω ∑∑ ++= i mmii XLDW
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Evidence of labor-capital distortion can be obtained from ξ
LK	
.  If ξ
LK
 is less (more) than one it shows 
that the subsidies make the implied price of labor more (less) than the implied price of capital 
leading to the substitution of capital (labor) for labor (capital).  ξ
LK
 can be used in Eq. (6) to capture 
the effect of federal labor protection in causing allocative distortions. But, it is not because its terms 
are in the formula for calculating deadweight loss. Therefore, we use the ratio of total employment 
to fleet size (L / K) to capture labor-capital distortion.
Federal Incentive Tier Subsidy. The federal matching formulae and the formula for disbursing 
federal capital and operating subsidies to transit systems also have been noted as sources of allocative 
inefficiency. From the theoretical section transit capital subsidies from federal sources require 20% 
local match and operating subsidies 50% match. Pickrell (1992) argues that the very small local 
match for capital subsidies skews investments in favor of capital-intensive programs and provides 
little incentive for local officials to consider less costly alternatives. Additionally, 9.2% of the 
Section 5307 formula grants that bus transit systems receive is incentive tier allocated based upon 
passenger miles squared over operating cost and it is a source of inefficiency. By penalizing transit 
systems with high operating costs, the formula distorts the optimal rate of substitution between 
labor, capital and the other inputs. Obeng and Azam (1995) studied the U.S. federal formula for 
disbursing operating subsidies to public transit systems and derived the following equation from it: 
(7)
Where, R is the ratio of federal operating subsidy to total operating cost and φ is the elasticity of 
operating subsidy with respect to the incentive tier component (i.e., passenger miles squared divided 
by operating cost).  Since R and φ are positive, the value of (1 + φR) is greater than one showing 
that by itself the formula distorts the optimal rate of input substitution in favor of capital and leads 
to inefficiency in terms of overuse of capital relative to labor thereby increasing cost. We account 
for the incentive tier’s effect by including passenger miles (PM) as a variable in the decomposition 
equation.10
Extensiveness of Vehicle Maintenance. Almost three decades ago, Bonnell (1981) summarized a 
Comptroller General (1981) report on federal transit operating subsidies and their uses to identify 
the causes of the soaring financial crisis in public transit systems.11 He reported that due to peaking 
and restrictive union contracts that prevented the use of part-time labor, transit systems were not 
using labor efficiently; that transit systems were not properly recruiting, training and promoting 
mechanics resulting in bus repairs that were improperly done; that transit systems did not have 
preventive maintenance programs and had rules that prevented the efficient use of maintenance 
labor. Bonnell (1981) also found that in one large transit system, promotions of bus maintenance 
personnel were based upon seniority rather than merit, acquired skill or aptitude, and he listed 
several instances of waste and cost increases. Since that report changes by the Federal Transit 
Administration (FTA) and its predecessor, the Urban Mass Transportation Administration, have 
addressed many of these concerns. For example, the FTA now requires transit systems to have 
maintenance plans for vehicles purchased with federal subsidies and to operate such vehicles for at 
least 12 years. Despite these changes, subsidies have been linked to early retirement of buses and 
investments in capital intensive inefficient transit systems (Pickrell 1992). Cromwell (1989) alludes 
to the less money that recipients of federal capital subsidies spend on vehicle maintenance. He found 
that private providers of transit services spent 45% more on maintenance per mile and devoted 
29% more labor hours to maintenance than did public providers. He further found that a 10% 
increase in transit capital subsidies reduced vehicle maintenance by 1.6% and that this reduction 
was statistically significant. Hilton (1974) and Kemp et al. (1983) argue that capital grants do not 
encourage vehicle and facility maintenance. We account for the importance of maintenance in the 
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decomposition by including three variables. The first is a binary variable (AGE)  which takes a value 
of one if average fleet age is greater than 12 years and a value of a zero otherwise to account for the 
FTA’s 12 years of vehicle use regulation. This variable also accounts for the Taubman and Rasche 
(1971) effects mentioned in the introduction. The second is the number of maintenance facilities 
owned (M
F	
) and the third is leasing versus owning maintenance facilities (M
o	
). These variables are 
expected to account for the extensiveness and effectiveness of vehicle maintenance programs and 
their possible effects on coordination of maintenance activities, duplication and over-employment 
all of which lead to inefficiencies.
“Easy Money.” As the discussion in the background section shows, the federal role in providing 
transit subsidies has been declining. In response local areas have established dedicated funding 
sources for their transit systems. These sources include property taxes, tolls, utility taxes and 
vehicle rental taxes. Some states such as North Carolina allow counties to increase their sales taxes 
by between 0.25 and 0.5 cents and impose special fees on rented vehicles to fund public transit 
systems. The availability of dedicated funding creates a continuous stream of money to be used for 
capital acquisition, operations and service expansion. For some transit systems, the funds from these 
sources make them earn after-subsidy profits as noted earlier. To the extent that some transit systems 
advocate for the establishment of dedicated local funding sources that may inadvertently lead to 
after-subsidy profits, they may be rent seeking and this could lead to inefficiency. We account for 
“easy money” by including a binary variable for availability of local dedicated sources of funding 
(LOCDED). 
Federal Regulations and Other Variables.  Since the 1980s the federal government has required 
transit systems to contract out portions of their operations to private sector companies. The premise 
is that there are cost efficiencies from private sector provision of public transit services or contracting 
out services to the private sector. To account for contracting the decomposition includes a binary 
variable (PUR) showing if or not a transit system purchases transportation from the private sector. 
The FTA also requires transit systems to maintain a spare ratio of 20% of the vehicles they operate in 
maximum service. The rationale is to avoid resource misallocation by using the subsidies to acquire 
and maintain excessive fleet. This requirement is accounted for in the decomposition by a binary 
variable (SPRATIO) that takes a value of one if the spare ratio is equal to or greater than 20% and 
a zero otherwise. Finally, fleet size is included in the decomposition to account for heterogeneity.
DATA
The data for estimating the cost, share and the decomposition equations are from the 2006 U.S. 
National Transportation Statistics (NTS) database.12 The sample consists of 227 single-mode bus 
transit systems each of which received both operating and capital subsidies and had no missing 
data on output and inputs. Labor is measured as hours worked, fleet size is a proxy for capital, and 
gallons of fuel are a proxy for all other inputs (i.e., all non-labor and non-capital inputs). Labor price 
(w) is annual total labor compensation including benefits divided by annual labor hours; the price 
of capital (r) is yearly bus user cost13 and following Nadiri and Schankerman (1981) capital cost 
rK is added to operating cost to give total cost and the price (p) of other inputs is total operating 
cost less total labor compensation divided by gallons of fuel. Using these prices total cost is 
C = wL + pF + rK.
The descriptive statistics in Table 3 show that the ratios of operating subsidy to input costs are far 
larger than the corresponding ratios of capital subsidy to input cost. For both subsidies, this ratio is 
largest for the other inputs and smallest for labor. The mean transit system received $11.212 million 
and $2.608 million in operating and capital subsidies respectively while paying $18.21 per hour for 
labor, a price of $2.53 per gallon for fuel ($8.45 per unit of the other inputs), and incurring capital 
user costs of $44,423 per vehicle and a total cost of $18.946 million. This transit system produced 
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2.959 million vehicle miles of service using 6.202 million hours of labor, 94 vehicles and 0.584 
million gallons of fuel. 42.3% of the sampled transit systems purchased transportation services from 
private sector companies, 79.3% owned their maintenance facilities, 3.5% leased these facilities 
and 12.08% owned and leased some of them. Finally, 37% had dedicated local funding and on the 
average each owned 1.74 maintenance facilities. 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. 
Total Cost  ($ million) 227 18.946 29.553 
Vehicle miles  (million) 227 2.959 4.349 
Labor wage ($) 227 18.21 58.77 
Capital user cost per vehicle ($) 227 44,422.73 6,075.01 
Fuel price per gallon ($) 227 2.53 2.61 
Labor hours (million) 227 6.202 0.844 
Fleet size 227 94 119 
Gallons of fuel (million) 227 0.584 1.004 
Capital subsidy ($ million) 227 2.608 4.157 
Operating subsidy ($ million) 227 11.212 17.814 
Ratio of operating subsidy to labor cost 227 1.155 0.234 
Ratio of operating subsidy to the costs of the other inputs 227 2.667 0.744 
Ratio of operating subsidy to capital cost 227 2.448 1.195 
Ratio of capital subsidy to labor cost 227 0.325 0.411 
Ratio of capital subsidy to capital cost 227 0.645 0.971 
Ratio of capital subsidy to the cost of the other inputs  227 0.714 0.819 
Ratio vehicles operated in maximum service to fleet size 227 0.723 0.153 
Directly operated service 227 0.577 0.495 
Availability of local dedicated funding source 227 0.370 0.483 
Number of maintenance facilities 227 1.742 1.340 
Proportion owning maintenance facilities 227 0.793 0.407 
Proportion leasing maintenance facilities 227 0.035 0.186 
Proportion leasing and owning maintenance facility 227 0.128 0.335 
RESULTS
Table 4 shows the results of estimating the cost and share equations for labor and the other inputs 
jointly using iterative non-linear seemingly unrelated methods. At convergence the model used 164 
observations and gave coefficients of determination of 0.7590, 0.3706 and 0.3150 for cost, and the 
cost share equations for labor and the other inputs respectively. From the estimated coefficients 
the long run shares of labor, capital and the other inputs in implied cost are respectively 68.63%, 
25.83% and 5.54% and the calculated mean value of ln(υ) is 0.5255 (Std.	Dev.	=	0.082). This latter 
result shows that total actual cost is 52.55% larger than the minimum implied cost. Alternatively, 
it shows that at the mean the subsidies account for a little more than a half of the total actual cost 
of transit systems. Using the relevant coefficients in the price elasticity of input demand equation  
 Table 5 shows the mean values of price elasticities of input demand and the 
deadweight losses.14 Very clearly, all transit inputs have inelastic demand, and in absolute terms the 
elasticities of input demand are relatively large for capital (0.8676) and the other inputs (0.5756) 
than they are for labor (0.2416). 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
Fuel is a proxy for all non-labor and non-capital inputs. Therefore, its costs include the costs of materials, tires 
and all types of liquid fuels, and a portion of the cost of purchased service.
,1)/( ** += iiiii SS βϑ
Deadweight Costs of Operating and Capital Subsidies
49
 Variable Parameter Estimate
Std. 
Error t value Probability
Share of operating subsidy in capital cost ( )oKH  oKµ 0.1941 0.0012 165.2000 <.0001
Share of operating subsidy in labor cost ( )oLH  oLµ 0.5631 0.0007 816.1300 <.0001
Share of operating subsidy in the cost of the 
other inputs ( )oFH  oF
µ 0.2428 0.0010 252.9800 <.0001
Share of capital subsidy in capital cost ( )KKH  KKµ 0.4789 0.0089 54.0800 <.0001
Share of capital subsidy in labor cost ( )KLH  KLµ 0.4389 0.0073 60.0000 <.0001
Share of capital subsidy in the cost of the other 
inputs ( )KFH  KF
µ 0.0822 0.0059 13.8700 <.0001
)log( *w  Lβ  0.6863 0.0044 157.3200 <.0001
)log( *p  Fβ 0.2583 0.0036 72.6600 <.0001
)log( *r  Kβ 0.0554 0.0017 33.4000 <.0001
)log(5.0 *w )log( *w  LLβ 0.0555 0.0033 17.0400 <.0001
)log( *w )log( *p  LFβ 0.0453 0.0026 17.7000 <.0001
)log( *w )log( *r  LKβ 0.0102 0.0015 7.0500 <.0001
)log(5.0 *p )log( *p  FFβ 0.0391 0.0023 17.1600 <.0001
)log( *p )log( *r  FKβ 0.0061 0.0011 5.5600 <.0001
)log(5.0 *r )log( *r  KKβ 0.0041 0.0013 3.1100 0.0022
Constant oβ  0.7768 0.0490 15.8600 <.0001
Qln  Qβ 0.7805 0.0415 18.8000 <.0001
)ln()ln(5.0 QQ  QQβ 0.1593 0.0436 3.6600 0.0004
)ln()ln( *wQ  LQβ 0.0022 0.0042 0.5300 0.5940
)ln()ln( *pQ  FQβ 0.0002 0.0034 0.0500 0.9571
)ln()ln( *rQ  KQβ 0.0021 0.0017 1.2300 0.2202
 
Table 4: Estimated Coefficients
 Using these results, the mean deadweight loss for the 164 transit systems is $0.861 million, 
most of which comes from the subsidies going to labor ($0.440 million) possibly by not matching 
employment to skills, followed by those going to other inputs besides capital ($0.336 million), 
and then capital itself ($0.085 million). These results appear surprising because labor demand 
being relatively less sensitive to changes in its price than the other inputs should have the lowest 
deadweight loss. That, it does not, is because labor’s share in cost is the largest of the three inputs, 
and the larger the cost share of an input the larger is the deadweight loss. It follows from these 
results that the share of an input in cost has a larger impact on deadweight loss than the price 
elasticity of input demand. When deadweight loss is expressed as a ratio of total cost, its mean value 
of 6.83% decomposes into 3.74%, 0.56% and 2.53% respectively from the subsidies going to labor, 
capital and the other inputs. 
Also, Table 5 shows the results when either capital subsidy or operating subsidy is zero. When 
capital subsidy is zero, transit systems receive only operating subsidy and we are able to calculate 
deadweight losses for 215 of them using the estimated coefficients. Here, total actual cost exceeds 
the minimum implied cost by 48.57% and the share of deadweight loss in total actual cost is 5.66% 
or $0.78 million on the average. This deadweight loss decomposes into 3.05%, 0.36% and 2.25% 
respectively from the subsidies going to labor, capital, and all other inputs. When operating subsidy 
is zero, transit systems receive only capital subsidy and we are able to calculate deadweight losses 
for 220 of them. In this case total actual cost exceeds the minimum implied cost by a mere 9.99% and 
deadweight loss is only $50,287 or 0.44% of total actual cost on the average. This deadweight loss 
as a share in cost decomposes into 0.23%, 0.17% and 0.04% respectively from the subsidies going 
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Table 5: Elasticity, Cost Share and Deadweight Loss
Variable N Mean Std 
( )υln  164 0.5255 0.0817
Wage elasticity of labor demand 164 -0.2416 0.0656
Price elasticity of demand of the other inputs 164 -0.5756 0.0395
Price elasticity of capital demand 164 -0.8676 0.0083
Share of labor cost in actual total cost 164 0.6873 0.0655
Share of capital cost in implied cost 164 0.0531 0.0215
Share of the cost of the other inputs in actual total cost 164 0.2593 0.0516
Share of labor cost in implied cost 164 0.6749 0.0771
Share of capital cost  in actual total cost 164 0.0583 0.0140
Share of the cost of the other inputs in implied cost 164 0.2668 0.0637
Share of deadweight loss in actual total cost 164 0.0683 0.0216
Share of deadweight loss from labor in cost 164 0.0374 0.0149
Share of deadweight loss from the other inputs in cost 164 0.0253 0.0085
Share of deadweight loss from capital in  cost 164 0.0056 0.0032
Total deadweight loss ($) 164 861,081.77 1,435,368.63
Deadweight loss from labor demand ($) 164 439,838.54 722,008.38
Deadweight loss from the demand of the other inputs ($) 164 336,147.28 566,079.15
Deadweight loss from capital demand ($) 164 85.095.95 169,844.13
Operating Subsidies Only 
( )υln  215 0.4857 0.0696
Share of deadweight loss in total cost 215 0.0566 0.0170
Total deadweight Loss ($) 215 780,137.88 1,232,145.46
Share of deadweight loss from labor in cost 215 0.0305 0.0125
Share of deadweight loss from the other inputs in cost 215 0.0225 0.0071
Share of deadweight loss from capital in  cost 215 0.0036 0.0024
Deadweight loss from labor demand ($) 215 385,409 605,925.40
Deadweight loss from the demand of the other inputs ($) 215 328,214.03 522,875.22
Deadweight loss from capital demand ($) 215 66,514.33 133,069.33
Capital Subsidies Only 
( )υln  220 0.0999 0.0881
Share of deadweight loss in total cost 220 0.0043 0.0071
Total deadweight loss ($)  220 50,287.10 100,896.42
Share of deadweight loss from labor in cost 220 0.0023 0.0045
Share of deadweight loss from fuel in cost 220 0.0004 0.0008
Share of deadweight loss from capital in  cost 220 0.0017 0.0023
Deadweight loss from labor demand ($) 220 19,784.44 39,144.20
Deadweight loss from the demand of the other inputs ($) 220 4,047.22 8,251.73
Deadweight loss from capital demand ($) 220 26,455.45 58,124.55
*Excludes three transit systems whose elasticities of input demand were positive.
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to labor, capital, and all other inputs. Comparing these results, operating subsidy is responsible for 
most of the deadweight loss while capital subsidy adds very little to it. 
Additionally, we calculated the ratio of actual to optimal subsidies and found that no transit 
system received more than its optimal amount of each subsidy. For operating subsidies, the mean of 
this ratio is 0.1599 (Std.	Dev.	=	0.0696) and for capital subsidies it is 0.1389 (Std.	Dev.	=	0.1206). 
Therefore, the deadweight losses are not because the transit systems received excess subsidies but 
the presence of waste in using some of the subsidies, particularly operating subsidies. 
Finally, Table 6 shows the results of estimating the decomposition equation. This equation 
explains 86.53% of the variation in deadweight loss, and all the variables have statistically significant 
coefficients except three. These are purchased transportation, year-of-vehicle-use regulation and 
spare ratio regulation. Examining the coefficients, those of transit systems which do not directly 
own their maintenance facilities and the absence of “easy money” are statistically significant and 
negative. The respective coefficients of these variables show that they are associated with $234,273 
and $228,323 reductions in deadweight loss. The other estimated coefficients are positive and their 
variables are associated with increases in deadweight losses. From these latter coefficients, the 
marginal effect of the labor-capital ratio, our indicator of Section 13(C) effect, is an increase of 
$141,493 in deadweight loss and the marginal effect of the number of maintenance facilities is 
an increase of $229,716 in deadweight loss. Comparatively, the marginal effects of fleet size and 
passenger miles (i.e., the incentive tier) are increases in deadweight loss of $4,222.90 and $0.0228 
respectively. 
Table 6: Sources of Deadweight Loss
Variable Estimate Std. Error t Probability 
Intercept -865,534.00 212,446.00 -4.07 <.0001 
Extensiveness of maintenance    
:12>AGE Years of use regulation 
(Yes =1, No = 0) 
-115,807.00 325,693.00 -0.36 0.7227 
:oM Does not own of maintenance facility 
(Yes = 1, No = 0) 
-234,273.00 128,223.00 -1.83 0.0697 
:FM Number of maintenance facilities used 229,716.00 47,205.00 4.87 <.0001 
Incentive tier    
:PM Passenger miles  0.0228 0.0030 7.55 <.0001 
Federal labor protection    
:/KL Section 13(C) effect, i.e., employees 
per vehicle  
141,493.00 46,954.00 3.01 0.0030 
“Easy money”    
:LOCDED No dedicated local funding  
(Yes = 1, No = 0) 
-228,323.00 93,181.00 -2.45 0.0154 
Other variables    
:K Fleet size 4,222.90 718.87 5.87 <.0001 
:PUR Purchased transportation 
(Yes = 1, No = 0) 
33,473.00 100,427.00 0.33 0.7394 
:SPRATIO Spare ratio regulation 181,915.00 115,008.00 1.58 0.1158 
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CONCLUSION
The purpose of this paper is to calculate the deadweight losses from the operating and capital 
subsidies received by U.S. public transit systems. The calculation extends the works of Tullock 
(1997). It uses data for 227 single-mode bus transit systems and estimates a neoclassical cost function 
that does not assume cost minimization. The results show that when both subsidies are considered 
the deadweight loss is $0.861 million on the average largely due to $0.440 million, $0.851 million 
and $0.336 million from misusing some of the subsidies going to labor, capital and other inputs 
respectively. Overall, deadweight loss accounts for 6.83% of the total cost of the average public 
transit system. When operating subsidy alone is considered, the deadweight loss is on the average 
$0.78 million, and when capital subsidy alone is considered it is $0.050 million. Thus, most of the 
deadweight loss comes from operating subsidies. A decomposition of the deadweight loss when 
both subsidies are received using regression shows that the factors which are positively associated 
with it are the extensiveness of maintenance operations, Section 5333(b) labor protection effect 
(i.e., the effect of Section 13(c)), the effect of the incentive tier of the federal formula grant and fleet 
size. Two factors negatively associated with deadweight loss are leasing instead of directly owning 
maintenance facilities and the absence of “easy money” in the form of not having local dedicated 
funding sources. The latter result suggests that funding agencies should ensure that transit systems 
with local dedicated funding sources pursue cost minimization objectives. Also, from the results, 
deadweight loss from operating and capital subsidies can be reduced by changing the formula for 
the incentive tier of the Section 5307 formula grants possibly by removing operating cost as a 
denominator thereby ridding it of its inefficiency effect, and revising the federal labor protection 
clause imposed by Section 5333(b) of the FTA Act by lobbying for congressional action to reduce 
the years over which compensation should be paid to those whose jobs are adversely affected by 
federal subsidies. A limitation of this study is its inability to capture rents and wage premiums from 
subsidies earned by labor unions and equipment suppliers over time. To that extent, the deadweight 
losses reported herein are approximate.
Endnotes
1. Federal regulations do not allow using subsidies and other monies from federal sources to 
influence how subsidies are allocated such as hiring lobbyists. But, transit systems can use their 
employees who work at least 130 days for them for such purposes.
2. These are paid to U.S steamship yards that are constructing subsidized ships to prevent them 
from losing their businesses to foreign shipyards. 
3. These are paid to U.S. flagship owners for the incremental costs of hiring crews who are U.S. 
citizens.
4. Since these subsidies also require local matching funds, local subsidies too depend upon input 
levels. 
5. The choice of output does not affect the results.   
6. Throughout this paper the terms “implied,” “misperceived,” and “after-subsidy” are used 
interchangeably.
7. Though we use labor in this discussion other inputs can also be used. The choice of an input 
does not affect the equations derived. 
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8. In specifying this equation we do not include such characteristics of operating environment 
as population and population density and route miles because their coefficients were not 
statistically significant in an initial specification of the model that included them. 
9. The FTA suggests a spare ratio of 20% of the vehicles operated in maximum service. 
10. Although we could have used passenger miles squared over operating cost, we opt for this 
approach because the total actual cost used in calculating deadweight loss includes operating 
cost.  
11. These findings are also contained in: Comptroller General 1981. Report to the Congress of the 
United States: Soaring Transit Subsidies must be controlled. United States General Accounting 
Office, Washington D.C. 
12. These transit systems operate regular buses, vanpools, express bus services and demand 
responsive services.
13. Capital cost is calculated as rK = Kr
K
 (R + d)e−d(z) where, K is fleet size, r
K
 is the weighted 
average price of a new public transit bus in 2006 and z is the weighted average fleet age. R is 
the average prime rate for 2006, d is a straight line rate of depreciation assuming a bus useful 
life of 20 years.
14. To estimate the equations the expression (1 − μ
oL
H
oL	
− μ
KL
H
KL
)−1 in the actual cost and labor share 
equations was expanded up to first order to obtain (1 + μ
oL
H
oL	
+ μ
KL
H
KL
). The same expansion 
was done for similar terms in the capital and fuel share equations. Notice that because μ and  H	
take values between zero and one the quadratic and higher order terms in this expansion reduce 
the cost and input shares by very small amounts. 
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APPENDIX A 
From Figure 3 the deadweight loss is,
(A.1) 
To operationalize Eq. (A.1), let η
i
 be the absolute value of own price elasticity of input demand 
and rewrite it as,
(A.2)
Expanding and solving this equation gives ΔL	= L*η
L
Δln w, and substituting the implied price of 
labor into it gives ΔL	= L*η
L
(μ
oL
H
oL
 + μ
KL
H
kL	
)  where  Δln (w) = w
0 
− w*/ w
o 
 = (μ
oL
H
oL
 + μ
KL	
H
KLi	
). 
Additionally, substituting these results into Eq. (A.1 gives the deadweight loss from misusing some 
of the subsidies going to labor as:
(A.3) 
 
Expressing L* in observable terms by solving for it in ( )KLKLoLoLL HHLLLL µµη +==∆ **  and 
substituting the result into Eq. (A.3), gives Eq. (A.4) as the deadweight loss from misusing some of 
the subsidies going to labor. 
(A.4)
Where, C is the observed total cost, S
L
 the observed share of an input in total cost, and all other terms 
are defined already. Rewriting and generalizing this equation gives, 
(A.5)
Taking the sum of this equation over all inputs and dividing both sides of the result by actual total 
cost gives the share of the deadweight loss in this cost as:
 
(A.6)
Further, differentiating Eq. (A.5) with respect to A
o
 gives:
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(A.7)
Setting Eq. (A.7) to zero and solving for the optimal level of operating subsidy Âo, we have: 
(A.8)
Writing a similar equation as A.4 for capital and differentiating it with respect to capital subsidy 
gives,
(A.9)
To determine if these optimal subsidies are minimum or maximum we further differentiate Eq. 
(A.8) with respect to operating subsidies. That differentiation yields, 
(A.10)
Since  LwAgAh oOLooLo //,/ ?µηµ =∂∂=∂∂  substituting them into (A.10) gives, 
(A.11)
Substituting the optimal value of operating subsidy into the expression for h and the result into 
A.11 gives a negative value for the second order partial derivative as can be seen by inspection. 
Therefore, the optimal subsidies calculated are the maximum subsidies. 
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APPENDIX B 
Both the implied cost and actual total cost are related by the relationship  ,. 
This is because  Since the share of labor in   total implied cost is
 and  w	/ w* = 1/(1 − μoLHol − μKLHKL), the first term of the actual total cost equation is
. Writing similar expressions for the other terms, substituting them into 
the actual total cost equation and then factorizing results in Eq. (B.1). 
(B.1)
Taking the logarithms of this equation gives Eq. (B.2).
(B.2)
Where, υ is the term in braces in Eq. (B.1). 
Substituting the translog expansion of lnC* into Eq. (B.2) gives Eq. (B.3) below. 
(B.3)
Where, the term in braces is the implied cost function and symmetry and homogeneity of degree 
one in input price restrictions are imposed on it. In the case of symmetry, for example, β
KL
 = β
LK
 and
β
QL
 = β
LQ	
, and for homogeneity of degree one in input prices the restrictions below apply. 
(B.4)
From the implied cost function Eq. (B.5) is the share of labor in implied cost. 
(B.5)
Similar equations as (B.5) can also be written for both the shares of capital and the other 
inputs in implied total cost. Examining this equation  must be expressed in terms of actual 
cost share since it is unobservable. To do so we multiply w	= w* /(1 − μ
oL
H
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 − μ
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)  and 
p	= p* /(1 − μ
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H
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)  respectively by labor (L) and the other inputs (F) and divide each 
result by actual total cost (C). The results in Eq. (B.6) express actual cost shares of labor (S
L	
) and 
the other inputs (S
F	
) in terms of their respective implied cost shares. 
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